In an oligopoly, firms are interdependent, meaning their profit outcomes depend significantly on the decisions made by their competitors. This interdependence is crucial in understanding how firms operate within this market structure. A classic example of this is a duopoly, where only two firms exist, such as Jack and Jill, who own the only wells in a small town. In this scenario, both firms have no costs associated with pumping water, simplifying the analysis as both marginal and average total costs are zero.
When analyzing their demand schedule, it becomes evident that as quantity increases, price decreases, adhering to the law of demand. The total revenue, which equals profit in this case due to the absence of costs, is calculated by multiplying price by quantity. For instance, when the quantity is 60, the price is also 60, leading to a maximum revenue of 3,600, which is the same profit a monopoly would achieve by producing at this quantity.
In contrast, perfect competition leads to a situation where price equals marginal cost, resulting in no economic profit. In an oligopoly, firms can maximize their profits through collusion, effectively acting as a monopoly. If Jack and Jill agree to produce 30 gallons each, they can achieve a total profit of 3,600, mirroring the monopoly profit. However, this collusive agreement presents an incentive to cheat, as one firm may increase output to gain a larger share of the market.
For example, if Jill decides to cheat and produces 40 gallons while Jack sticks to 30, the total quantity rises to 70, causing the price to drop to 50. Jack's profit decreases to 1,500, while Jill's profit increases to 2,000, demonstrating the temptation to deviate from collusion. The total industry profit declines to 3,500, indicating that while individual profits may rise through cheating, the overall profit for both firms diminishes.
In a scenario where both firms cheat and produce 40 gallons each, the total quantity reaches 80, leading to a price of 40. Here, both Jack and Jill earn 1,600, resulting in a total profit of 3,200. This outcome illustrates the prisoner's dilemma, where both firms are worse off than if they had cooperated. The dynamics of collusion and the temptation to cheat highlight the complexities of decision-making in oligopolistic markets, emphasizing the delicate balance between cooperation and competition.